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I. INTRODUCTION 
Hong Kong has functioned as a British Crown colony since 1842 
when Great Britain (Britain) and China signed the Treaty of Nanking1 
under which Hong Kong was ceded in perpetuity. By means of the con-
stitutional devices of Letters Patent and Orders in Council, the various 
parts forming the territory of Hong Kong have been brought under Brit-
ish administration.2 The Government of the People's Republic of China 
(PRC), however, has consistently maintained that the three British trea-
ties relating to Hong Kong are "unequal treaties"3 and hence not binding 
upon China (and that Hong Kong is therefore part of Chinese territory). 
It consequently requested the removal of Hong Kong from the colonial 
territories listed by the United Nations (UN) under the Declaration on 
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1. Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Commerce & Indemnity Great Britain-China, Aug. 29. 
1842 30 Brit. For. 389, 93 Parry's T.S. 465 reprinted in Wesley-Smith, British Dependent Terri-
tories: Hong Kong in 5 CONSTITUTIONS OI- Dti'iNDFNCii.s AND SPF.CIAI. SOVFRFIGNTIFS 21 
(A. & E. Blaustein ed. 1985) [hereinafter Blaustein]. Stonecutter Island and the Southern part 
of the Kowloon Peninsula were ceded under the Convention of Peace and Friendship Between 
Great Britain and China, signed at Peking October 24, 1860. Id. at 23. In 1898 the New 
Territories were leased to Britain for 99 years. Id. at 25, 
2. See Charter for Erecting the Island of Hong Kong into a Separate Colony, and for 
Providing for the Government Thereof, April 5, 1843, Letters Patent. Id. at 22. Order in 
Council Providing Tor the Administration of the Territories Adjacent to Hong Kong Acquired 
by Her Majesty Under the Anglo-Chinese Convention of October 24, I860. Id. at 27. 
3. See P. WFSITY-SMITH UNFQUAI. TRFATY 1898-1997: CHINA, GRF.AT BRITAIN AND 
HONG KONG'S N E W TF.RRITORIFS 162-63, 167-68, 185-87(1980), 
1 
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the Granting of Independence to Colonial Territories and Peoples.4 The 
PRC's request was granted.5 
The success of the Chinese request notwithstanding, the doctrine of 
the invalidity of unequal treaties cannot be said to be accepted as part of 
international law.6 Indeed, despite views of some Chinese and Soviet ju-
rists to the contrary,7 there is no rule of international law invalidating a 
treaty merely by reason of inequality of obligations unless the conclusion 
of the treaty has been procured by a threat or use of force in violation of 
the principles of international law embodied in the UN Charter.8 In any 
event, the application to the above British treaties9 of the current rules of 
international law as expressed in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties is precluded by virtue of the principle of nonretroactivity con-
tained therein.10 
This article will examine first, Hong Kong's present status in inter-
national law; second, the issue of self-determination for Hong Kong; 
third, the Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Future of Hong Kong, its 
4. See Letter of March 10, 1972 from the Chinese delegate, Huang Hu, to the UN Com-
mittee on Decolonization, reprinted in 1 PEOPLE'S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL L A W : A 
DOCUMENTARY STUDY 384 (J. Cohen & H. Chiu eds. 1974) [hereinafter Cohen]. 
5. Id. 
6. As elaborated by Chiu, no support can be found in the writings of Western interna-
tional law scholars for the doctrine of the invalidity of unequal treaties. See Chiu, Comparison 
of Nationalist and Communist Chinese Views of Unequal Treaties in CHINA'S PRACTICE OF 
INTERNATIONAL L A W , 241, 267 (J. Cohen ed. 1972). Moreover, Western state practice in-
cludes several cases of acceptance of the validity of treaties which might be deemed "unequal." 
See Leng, The Sino-Soviet Dispute in L A W IN CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY: COMMUNIST 
CHINA AND SELECTED PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL L A W 263, 279 n.47 (S. Leng & H. 
Chiu eds. 1972). 
7. See Dicks, Treaty, Grant, Usage or Sufferance? Some Legal Aspects of the Status of 
Hong Kong, 95 CHINA QUARTERLY 727, 734 (1983) [hereinafter Dicks]. 
8. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 52 U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, re-
printed in 8 INT 'L LEGAL MATERIALS 679, 698 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. Note, 
however, that "force" in art. 52 does not encompass economic and military coercion, although 
(as a compromise solution of conflicting state views) a Declaration incorporated in the Final 
Act of the Conference "[s]olemnly condemns the threat or use of pressure in any form, 
whether military, political or economic, by any State in order to coerce another State to per-
form any act relating to the conclusion of a treaty in violation of the principle of the sovereign 
equality of States and freedom of consent." See also Declaration on the Prohibition of Mili-
tary, Political or Economic Coercion in the Conclusion of Treaties, Final Act of the U.N. 
Conference on the Law of Treaties, reprinted in 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 728. 733 (1969). 
It should nonetheless be noted that the Declaration is viewed as representing lex ferenda (the 
law which is desirable to establish) as distinct from lex lata (existing law). See H. Chiu. T H E 
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE L A W OF TREATIES 104 (1972) [hereinafter Chiu]. 
9. See supra note 1. 
10. Art. 4 of the Vienna Convention, supra note 8, reads: "Without prejudice to the appli-
cation of any rules set forth in the present Convention to which treaties would be subject under 
international law independently of the Convention, the Convention applies only to treaties 
which are concluded by States after the entry into force of the present Convention with regard 
to such States." 
For a general analysis of the effect on the validity of the Hong Kong treaties of arguments 
based on inequality see Note, Hong Kong's Future: Can the People's Republic of China Invali-
date the Treaty of Nanking as an Unequal Treaty?, 7 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 534 (1984). 
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validity, implementation, interpretation, and the issue of nationality 
under the Joint Declaration; and last, Hong Kong's potential interna-
tional status after the transition to Chinese rule in 1997. It will be argued 
that the Joint Declaration is a valid international treaty which provides a 
framework for preserving Hong Kong as an autonomous "city-state" 
whose socio-economic system reflects capitalist principles. At the same 
time, the limitations of the agreement will be highlighted and it will be 
emphasized that the future of the territory does not depend on the valid-
ity of the agreement alone but also depends on the willingness and ability 
of the PRC, Hong Kong and third parties to translate into reality the 
complex vision which it embodies. 
II. HONG KONG'S PRESENT STATUS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
From a pragmatic point of view, Britain's responsibility for, and its 
administration over the territory have been acknowledged both by the 
international community and the PRC.11 States have established treaty 
relations and other interests with the United Kingdom (UK) with respect 
to Hong Kong.12 For its part, the PRC has not directly challenged or 
expressed any misgivings about Britain's conclusion of bilateral and mul-
tilateral agreements on behalf of Hong Kong, or the fact that it has rep-
resented the territory and its inhabitants in relation to third states.13 
Furthermore, the PRC has extended recognition to foreign consular rep-
resentatives accredited by the British government in Hong Kong. It has 
also accepted the right of the UK to issue currency in Hong Kong (one 
of the most important attributes of sovereignty).14 
Although under ultimate British control, Hong Kong has enjoyed a 
unique status with a considerable measure of independence in interna-
tional contexts.15 Thus, for example, it is treated as a separate territory 
for the purpose of multilateral agreements such as the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).16 It is also a member of several 
11. As pointed out by one observer, "[b]y removing Hong Kong from the list of colonies 
due to become independent, China in effect allowed the status quo to continue in 'Hong 
Kong.'" Ching, The MacLehose-Youde Years: Steadying the 'Three Legged Stool'. . . The 
Historic Triangle of Britain, China and Hong Kong: A Sixty-Year Retrospective 1927-1987, 
Hong Kong Baptist College, 11 June 1987, at 9. 
12. See Dicks, supra note 7, at 737-39. 
13. China's pragmatism can be attributed to the economic benefits which it derives from 
Hong Kong. See Jao, Hong Kong's Role in Financing China's Modernization, in CHINA AND 
HONG KONG 12 (A. Youngson ed. 1983). 
14. See Dicks, supra note 7, at 739-41. 
15. See Mushkat, The Transition from British to Chinese Rule in Hong Kong: A Discus-
sion of Salient International Legal Issues, 14 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 171, 172-73 (1986) 
[hereinafter Mushkat]. 
16. See Booklet by British Caledonian Airways, BUSINESS DESTINATION HONG KONG 55 
(1984) [hereinafter BUSINESS DESTINATION]. Note that in 1986 Hong Kong became a party 
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international organizations, including the United Nations Economic and 
Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Asian Pro-
ductivity Organization (APO) and the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB).17 Furthermore, in several instances over the past decades, the 
Hong Kong Government, acting with the consent of the UK authori-
ties,18 has negotiated agreements with foreign governments concerning 
such critical matters as textile quotas.19 It is also worth noting that local 
officials have concluded a number of agreements with the Provincial gov-
ernment of Guandong on questions of significant interest, such as the 
supply of water. 
III. T H E ISSUE OF SELF-DETERMINATION FOR HONG KONG 
Despite the high degree of independence enjoyed by Hong Kong, it 
remains in the final analysis a "colony" or a "non-self-governing terri-
tory." The question arises, whether its case falls within the terms of the 
UN General Assembly Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples (Resolution 1514).20 Under this declara-
tion it is required that "immediate steps shall be taken in Trust and Non-
Self-Governing Territories or all other territories which have not yet at-
tained independence, to transfer all powers to the people of those territo-
ries, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their 
freely expressed will and desire. . ."21 
Evidently, the UK government did not consider the issue of self-
determination for Hong Kong a cause for waging a Falklands-type war. 
The UK government views Hong Kong differently presumably because it 
is a Chinese community which cannot be controlled indefinitely by a Eu-
ropean power. In addition, Britain is obviously aiming at minimizing 
friction with the PRC and accommodating the latter's "reasonable" de-
mands. Unlike the Falklands and Gibraltar, Hong Kong is apparently 
an issue which cannot be managed through confrontational tactics be-
cause the other party (the PRC) is a fairly formidable opponent.22 Nor 
to GATT in its own right. See Hong Kong Government, HONG K O N G 1987 at 29 (1987) 
[hereinafter H O N G K O N G ] . 
17. See BUSINESS DESTINATION, supra note 16, at 55; H O N G K O N G 1987, supra note 16. 
at 76. 
18. See Dicks, The Law and Practice of Hong Kong and Foreign Investment in INTERNA-
TIONAL L A W PROBLEMS IN ASIA 153, 156 (Shepherd ed. 1969). 
19. Bilateral restraint agreements with textiles importing countries are negotiated by 
Hong Kong within the Multi Fibre Arrangement (MFA) under the GATT. See H O N G KONG 
1987, supra note 16, at 69-70. 
20. G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 66. U.N. Doc A1468 (1960). 
21. Id. at V 5. 
22. See Johnson, The Mouse-trapping of Hong Kong: A Game in which Nobody Wins, in 
20 ISSUES AND STUDIES 26, 27 (1984). 
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did it declare its commitment to "honour the freely and democratically 
expressed wishes" of the Hong Kong people as it had promised to the 
inhabitants of Gibraltar.23 The PRC's position was made clear when in 
1972 it reasserted that the question of Hong Kong was a matter of Chi-
nese sovereign right and that, as a consequence, Hong Kong should not 
be included in the list of colonial territories referred to in Resolution 
1514.24 
The Sino-British negotiations on the future of Hong Kong were 
treated throughout as a strictly bilateral, or even unilateral, affair and 
any notion of a "three-legged stool,"25 real or apparent, was summarily 
dismissed.26 The agreement itself,27 referred to as the Joint Declaration, 
was viewed by the parties as a mere transfer of sovereignty as from a 
specific date. 
Could the people of Hong Kong nonetheless claim a violation of a 
right to self-determination and perhaps call for the voidance of the Joint 
Declaration28 on the ground of its conflict with a peremptory norm of 
international law (jus cogens) as stipulated in article 5329 of the Vienna 
23. See United Kingdom Materials on International Law in 52 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 361, 
386 (1981) (Lisbon statement made on 10 April 1980 by the UK and Spanish Governments). 
See also 56 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 395-96 (1985) (Prime Minister Thatcher's statement in the 
House of Commons). 
24. See Cohen, supra note 4. The content of Hu's letter was as follows: 
As in known to all, the question of Hong Kong and Macao belong to the cate-
gory of questions resulting from a series of unequal treaties left over by history, trea-
ties which the imperialists imposed on China. 
Hong Kong and Macao are part of Chinese territory occupied by the British and 
Portuguese authorities. The settlement of the question of Hong Kong and Macao is 
entirely within China's sovereign right and does not fall under the category of colo-
nial territories. 
Consequently, they should not be included in the list of colonial territories cov-
ered by the declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and 
peoples. 
With regard to the questions of Hong Kong and Macao, the Chinese govern-
ment has consistently held that they should be settled in an appropriate way when 
conditions are ripe. The United Nations has no right to discuss these questions 
25. See Johnson, supra note 22, 40-41. 
26. Id. 
27. For the Draft Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the 
Future of Hong Kong, see Blaustein, supra note 1, at 90 reprinted in 23 INT'L LEGAL MATERI-
ALS 1366 (1984) [hereinafter Draft Agreement]. 
28. Id. Note that while technically the "Joint Declaration" constitutes only part of the 
Sino-British Agreement (other parts include three Annexes and Exchanges of Memoranda) the 
terms are used interchangeably. 
29. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 8, art. 53: 
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm 
of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremp-
tory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the 
international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is 
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general interna-
tional law having the same character. 
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Convention on the Law of Treaties?30 The answer to the first part of the 
question largely depends on whether the people of Hong Kong as such 
constitute "self"31 which would enable them to claim the right to deter-
mine their political status. An argument has been advanced that "a co-
hesive colony with an independent purpose, its own system of laws, and a 
clearly defined territory . . . [is] a prime candidate for self-determina-
tion",32 and that Hong Kong qualifies as such given the unique national-
ity of its people, the separate and distinct nature of its territory, the 
governing capability of its institutions and its capacity to enter into rela-
tions with other states.33 Yet, such a notion has clearly been rejected by 
the PRC34 implying that the recovery of sovereignty over Hong Kong 
gave expression to the right of self-determination of the entire Chinese 
people.35 Indeed, the acceptance by the UN of the PRC's request to re-
move Hong Kong from the list of colonies36 combined with the absence 
30. Id. Claims concerning the peremptory nature of the doctrine of self determination are 
discussed in M. POMERANCE, S E L F DETERMINATION IN L A W AND PRACTICE: T H E N E W 
DOCTRINE IN T H E UN 63-72 (1982) [hereinafter POMERANCE]. 
31. None of the relevant international documents including the UN Charter, G.A. Reso-
lution 1514, supra note 20, the two 1966 International Covenants on Human Rights reprinted 
in 61 A M . J. I N T ' L L. 861 (1967) and the 1970 Declaration or Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Char-
ter of the UN Resolution 2625 (XXV), reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL 
L A W 35 (1972)) contains a definition of the "peoples" who are the bearer of the right to self-
determination. Nor are objective criteria furnished therein to separate legitimate from illegiti-
mate claims. On the problem of "defining the 'self " and "separating the intertwined territo-
rial, ethnic and time factors" see Pomerance, Self Determination Today: The Metamorphosis of 
an Ideal, 19 ISRAEL L. R E V . 310, 311-12, 320-27 (1984) [hereinafter Metamorphosis]. 
32. See Comment, Self Determination in Hong Kong: A New Challenge to an Old Doc-
trine, 22 SAN D I E G O L. R E V . 839, 853-54 (1985). 
33. For a further discussion of this point see Wesley-Smith, Settlement of the Question of 
Hong Kong, 17 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 116, 117-19 (1987). Wesley-Smith notes additional factors 
as supporting a claim by Hong Kong people for self-determination, namely their cultural dis-
tinction from the Mainlanders, absence of PRC influence in Hong Kong's affairs, the marked 
difference in the political and economic systems between Hong Kong and the Mainland and 
the significant role played by Hong Kong in the world economy. Id. 
34. Since its establishment in 1947 the PRC has declared on various occasions that all 
Hong Kong Chinese, whether they are British subjects or not, are Chinese nationals. Indeed, 
in its reference to persons of Chinese ethnicity, China has always differentiated between two 
categories of Chinese: that of "compatriots" (i.e. those who live in Chinese sovereign territory 
including, Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan) and "overseas Chinese" (i.e. those who reside in a 
foreign territory). For an extensive discussion of the PRC's policy towards Hong Kong people 
see Chang, The Fate of Chinese British Subjects in Hong Kong: The Policy of Non-Recognition 
of the People's Republic of China, Working Paper 1986. Note that in its Memorandum which 
formed part of the Joint Declaration, the government of the People's Republic of China reaf-
firmed that under its nationality law "all Hong Kong Chinese compatriots, whether they are 
holders of 'British Dependent Territories Citizens' Passport' or not, are Chinese nationals". 
Blaustein, supra note 1; Chinese Memorandum at 117. 
35. See Draft Agreement, supra note 27. art. 1: "The Government of the People's Repub-
lic of China declares that to recover the Hong Kong area (including Hong Kong Island, Kovv-
loon and the New Territories, hereafter referred to as Hong Kong) is the common aspiration of 
the entire Chinese people, and that it has decided to resume the exercise of sovereignty over 
Hong Kong with effect from 1 July 1987" [emphasis added]. 
36. See supra note 5. 
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of a strong local nationalist sentiment37 and relevant UN practice38 may 
indicate that if the question of the Hong Kong "self" were adjudicated 
by the international community, the PRC position would have attracted 
support, either active or passive. 
Doubts have also been raised as to whether the principle of self-
determination has attained the status of jus cogens. Derogation from 
such jus cogens is proscribed.39 Such skepticism is reinforced by the 
"vagueness and indeterminacy" of the principle.40 There is also idiosyn-
crasy and hypocrisy in its application.41 The relative stature of the prin-
ciple of self-determination is furthermore evident in the light of its 
conflicts with other fundamental norms of international law such as terri-
torial integrity,42 non-intervention43 and sovereign equality.44 Indeed, 
Resolution 1514 itself acknowledges a potential conflict between the 
principle of self-determination and the fundamental principle of territo-
rial integrity in its stipulation that "any attempt aimed at a partial or 
total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a 
country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the 
Charter."45 
Needless to say, an argument against self-determination for the 
Hong Kong people based on territorial integrity would find support in 
37. The grievances that fed nationalist movements in other British colonies—ethnic dis-
crimination, economic underdevelopment, meagre opportunities for upward social mobility 
and poverty of the masses—are not to be found, or found in only a mild form, in Hong Kong. 
S. Lau, Decolonization without Independence: The Unfinished Political Reforms of the Hong 
Kong Government 10, (study for the Centre for Hong Kong Studies), Institute of Social Stud-
ies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong (1987). 
38. The practice in question relates to cases involving strong objections and counter 
claims by powerful neighboring States, e.g., Goa, East Timor, Ifni, Gibraltar and Falklands. 
See Metamorphosis, supra note 31, at 322-23. 
39. See POMERANCE, supra note 30. For the view that self-determination was never in 
fact an operative principle of the UN Charter but rather a desiderata of it see Blum, Reflections 
on the Changing Concept of Self-Determination, 10 ISRAEL L. REV. 509, 511 (1975). 
40. POMERANCE, supra note 30, at 24-25. 
41. See Resolution 1514, supra note 20. 
42. See BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW supra note 31, at 37. The 1970 
Declaration on Principles of International Law provides: "The principle that States shall re-
frain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integ-
rity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
purposes of the United Nations." Id. Demands for secession by a section of a nation clash 
with claims to territorial integrity or political independence of the State from which that sec-
tion wishes to separate itself. 
43. See id. at 40. "The principle concerning the duty not to intervene in matters within 
the domestic jurisdiction of any State, in accordance with the Charter." (This principle in 
effect also protects the territorial integrity and political independence of States). Self-determi-
nation struggles often involve claims to external support from other states in manifest contra-
diction to the principle of non-intervention. Id. 
44. Id. at 43. "The principle of sovereign equality of States" refers to the inviolability of 
States' territorial integrity and the rights of States to freely choose and develop their political, 
social, economic and cultural systems. The principle implies that sectional claims within a 
State conflict with the right of the State to develop as an aggregate entity. 
45. See POMERANCE, supra note 30. 
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consistent statements by PRC officials that Hong Kong was an internal 
problem and part of Chinese territory. The idea of the maintenance of 
national unity and territorial integrity is reemphasized in the Sino-British 
accord, under which Hong Kong is declared as part of the PRC and its 
people are not regarded as constituting a special population or special 
nation of Hong Kong.46 
It should be stressed, however, that the essence of self-determination 
is in the method not the result.47 Self-determination need not culminate 
in full independence and may also be accomplished by free association 
with an independent state or an integration with such a state provided it 
follows an informed and democratic process, paying due regard to the 
freely expressed will of the people.48 
Arguably, therefore, if the special legal status and the large measure 
of autonomy envisaged under the Sino-British Joint Declaration49 for the 
territory materialized, regardless of the lack of full independence, the as-
pirations of the Hong Kong people as inferred indirectly would have 
been satisfied.50 
46. See Draft Agreement, supra note 27, art. 3(1), at 1371 which provides: "[ujpholding 
national unity and territorial integrity and taking account of the history of Hong Kong and its 
realities, the People's Republic of China has decided to establish . . . a Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region upon resuming the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong." See also 
supra note 34. 
47. See POMERANCE, supra note 30, at 24-25. 
48. See Resolution 1514, supra note 20 and accompanying text. It is interesting to note 
that, having surveyed twenty-two instances of non-sovereign entities and federal states, Han-
num and Lillich have concluded that a trend might in fact be discerned "away from indepen-
dence and full statehood as the only answer to the problems perceived either by ethnic 
communities within existing States or by non-self-governing territories which have yet to 
emerge fully on the international stage." Hannum and Lillich, Concept of Autonomy in Inter-
national Law, in MODELS OF AUTONOMY 215, 253-54 (Y. Dinstein ed. 1981) [hereinafter Han-
num & Lillich]. 
49. See infra notes 51-111 and accompanying text. 
50. It may be noted that while the general requirement for determining the people's aspi-
rations is through an "informed and democratic process," it is by no means clear that plebi-
scites are the only proper means of ascertaining the population's desires. Indeed, UN practices 
seem occasionally to sanction processes which deviate from democratic norms. See discussion 
Metamorphosis, supra note 31, at 315-16, 330-31. It is in any event unlikely that the aspira-
tions of the Hong Kong people would be determined by a "genuine" democratic process as it 
appears that neither the PRC Government nor the Hong Kong Government have taken active 
steps to promote "genuine" democracy in the territory. For discussion of the Chinese attitude 
see Chen, Beijing Warns Hong Kong About Tilt to Democracy, South China Morning Post, 
October 1, 1985, at 2. 
1987] THE FUTURE OF HONG KONG 9 
IV. THE SINO-BRITISH JOINT DECLARATION ON THE 
FUTURE OF HONG KONG 
A. Its validity as a treaty under International Law 
With the exception of reservations expressed by some commenta-
tors,51 the designation of the Sino-British accord as a "Declaration" does 
not devalue its legal effect as an international agreement.52 It is clear 
that the parties themselves regard it as a binding legal instrument. Both 
prior to and after the announcement of the Declaration, the PRC and 
UK representatives stated that it constitutes an international agreement 
which "provides an effective guarantee for Hong Kong's future prosper-
ity and stability."53 The parties' sincere intention to contract a legally 
binding agreement is also reflected in their meticulous observance of the 
established practices regarding treaty making, namely accreditation of 
persons who conducted the negotiations, negotiations and adoption of 
the text (September 26, 1984), ratification, entry into force (May 27, 
1985) and finally registration with the UN in accordance with article 102 
of the UN charter (June 13, 1985). 
At the same time, it is evident that the PRC and the UK opted for a 
special technique of treaty making which afforded each of them the op-
portunity to reserve their particular legal opinions in drafting the respec-
tive declarations.54 Thus, "[t]he Government of the PRC declares . . . 
that it has decided to resume the exercise of sovereignty over Hong 
Kong" whereas the "Government of the UK declares that it will restore 
Hong Kong to the PRC."55 The transfer of sovereignty is absolute56 and 
51. See. e.g., Schlender & Wong, Businessman-like Plans for Hong Kong, Asian Wall St. 
J., September 28, 1984, at 1. 
52. See Vienna Convention, supra note 8, at 680-81. Art.2(l)(a) defines "treaty" as: "an 
international agreement concluded between states in written form and governed by interna-
tional law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and 
whatever its particular designation." [emphasis added]. Id. See also ILC's commentary in Sum-
mary Records of the 870th Meeting, [1966] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 185, 188, U.N. Doc A/ 
CN.4/186. It is interesting to note that under Chinese law as long as a written statement 
endorsed by two or more governments records not merely general principles but agreements 
on specific questions that incorporate definite rules of conduct it will be legally binding on the 
parties (no reference made to form). See Cohen, Legal Implications of Recognition of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China, 72 A. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 240, 242 (1978). And as observed by 
Hsiung, the Chinese tend to "look to the consensual intent rather than the specific modality or 
form of an agreement as the source of its binding force." J. HSIUNG, LAW AND POLICY IN 
CHINA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 223 (1972). 
53. See Hong Kong Lives! Asiaweek, October 5, 1984, at 22 (statement by Chinese Deputy 
Foreign Minister Zhou Nan at the signing of the agreement); for similar British statements see 
Ching, Hong Kong Clears the First Hurdle, Asian Wall St. J., October 1, 1984, at 6 (quoting 
British Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe and Hong Kong's later Governor Sir Edward 
Youde). 
54. See Ress, The Hong Kong Agreement and Its Impact on International Law (Taipei, 
Taiwan) 6-8 (March 3-8, 1986) (a paper presented at an international symposium on Hong 
Kong: A Chinese and International Concern). 
55. See Vienna Convention, supra note 8, arts. 1 and 2. 
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a termination of the treaty for whatever reason will not entitle the UK to 
recover sovereignty.57 Indeed, since it involves a partially consumated 
transaction, the Joint Declaration has given rise to "territorial" rights 
which are "inviolable" and cannot suffer from any subsequent termina-
tion of the treaty which originally created them.58 Nor for that matter 
could the parties invoke article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties in support of termination of the Sino-British Joint Declara-
tion by virtue of a change of circumstances (e.g. changes in the internal 
structure of the (Hong Kong Special Administrative Region)) given the 
nature of the agreement as a territorial treaty establishing a boundary59 
and a territorial status.60 
The effectiveness of the Joint Declaration, however, as distinct from 
its validity, hinges on complex factors which may induce a sense of un-
easiness among those seeking a high degree of certainty. The reason lies 
in the fact that the PRC is perceived as an actor that operates in the 
national and international arenas in a manner which reflects ad hoc inter-
ests of the faction in power rather than under international legal agree-
ments.61 Yet, analysts have offered a number of compelling reasons— 
economic, political and social—for Chinese adherence to the accord.62 
Commentators have also suggested that the PRC record of honoring its 
international agreements is reassuring insofar as future compliance with 
56. In accordance with section 1(2) of the Hong Kong Act 1985 ("An Act to make provi-
sion for and in the connection with the ending of British sovereignty and jurisdiction over 
Hong Kong"), "[a]s from 1st July 1997 Her Majesty shall no longer have sovereignty or juris-
diction over any part of Hong Kong." Under the Act this section came into force on May 27, 
1985 upon the exchange of instruments of ratification of the Joint Declaration between the 
Government of the UK and the PRC Government. 
57. See Vienna Convention, supra note 8, art. 70, sec. 1(b) which provides that the termi-
nation of a treaty "does not affect any right, obligation or legal situation of the parties created 
through the execution of the treaty prior to its termination." 
58. See A. DAVID, THE STRATEGY OF TREATY TERMINATION, LAWFUL BREACHES AND 
RETALIATIONS 14 (1975). "[T]o admit that consummated transactions can be affected by later 
changes in circumstances would expose territorial and other possessions to insecurity . . . " 
which will result eventually in a breach of international peace and order. Id. at 209. 
59. Under the Vienna Convention, supra note 8, art. 62, § 2, "[a] fundamental change of 
circumstances may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty 
(a) if the treaty establishes a boundary. . . ." 
60. Note that although the exception in article 62 has not been formally extended to all 
territorial rights per se, objections raised in this regard are confined to treaties which cannot be 
said to have been executed uno ictu (e.g., treaties guaranteeing rights to passage or authorizing 
the establishment of military bases). See Haraszti, Treaties and the Fundamental Change of 
Circumstances, III RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 66-67 (1975). Arguably, a treaty such as the Sino-
British Joint Declaration which defines territorial sovereignty can be assimilated to a "bound-
ary treaty" for the purpose of exclusion from the ambit of the Rebus Sic Stantibus claim under 
article 62, § 2. 
61. See L. PYE, THE DYNAMICS OF CHINESE POLITICS 6-13 (1981). 
62. See Comment, Legal Aspects of the Sino-British Draft Agreement on the Future of 
Hong Kong, 20 TEX. INT'L L.J. 167, 184-87 (1985) [hereinafter Legal Aspects]; Day, The Re-
covery of Hong Kong by the People's Republic of China—A Fifty Year Experiment in Capitalism 
and Freedom, 11 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COMM. 625, 643-48 (1984). 
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the Joint Declaration is concerned. 
B. Implementation 
(1) Formal/Institutional 
The formal implementation of the Joint Declaration does not seem 
to pose any obvious problems. Indeed from an institutional standpoint, 
the implementation process has progressed according to schedule64 and 
significant achievements have been registered.65 The Sino-British Joint-
Liaison Group, set up under the terms of the accord on May 27, 1985 has 
met regularly and established several subgroups of experts to discuss spe-
cific issues with a view to ensuring a smooth transfer of government and 
the continued application of international rights and obligations to Hong 
Kong after 1997.66 Similarly, the Sino-British Land Commission, which 
was mandated to monitor and consult on land matters, has been quite 
effective in constructing land disposal programs, including accounting ar-
rangements for the sharing of income from land sales and devising legal 
documents for use in transactions.67 Organizational progress has also 
marked the work of the Basic Law Drafting Committee. This Commit-
tee was appointed by the Chinese National People's Congress in accord-
ance with paragraph 3(12) of the Joint Declaration and the policies of the 
PRC regarding Hong Kong as elaborated in annex I of the Joint Declara-
tion.68 The Basic Law Drafting Committee is charged with the responsi-
bility of producing a draft Basic Law for the HK SAR in 1988. In 
addition, the Basic Law Consultative Committee formed by the Chinese 
63. See Legal Aspects, supra note 62; Mushkat, supra note 15, at 193-94. 
64. For an account of the developments which are described in the following paragraphs 
see W H I T E PAPER ON THE A N N U A L REPORT ON H O N G K O N G 1984-85 TO THE U N I T E D 
K I N G D O M PARLIAMENT, 18 December 1985 [hereinafter W H I T E PAPER I] W H I T E PAPER ON 
T H E A N N U A L REPORT ON H O N G K O N G 1985-86 TO THE U N I T E D K I N G D O M PARLIAMENT, 
21 February 1987 [hereinafter W H I T E PAPER II]. 
65. Including a Sino-British agreement that Hong Kong should be deemed a separate 
contracting pa rty to the GATT and should continue in that status after 1997 in the name of 
"Hong Kong, China," see W H I T E PAPER II, supra note 64, at 3; an agreement for the contin-
ued membership of Hong Kong in the Asian Development Bank under which the PRC will 
guarantee Hong Kong's financial obligations to the Bank after 1997, see W H I T E PAPER I, 
supra note 64, at 2; an agreement on transitional measures relating to the principal travel and 
identity documents issued to Hong Kong residents (to avoid any disruption in this area on 1 
July 1997); an agreement on the principles for the establishment of a separate Hong Kong 
register of shipping which can be maintained beyond 1997; an agreement for the construction 
of separate Air Service Agreements between Hong Kong and its aviation partners which are 
capable of remaining in force after 1997; an agreement on the introduction of a new pension 
scheme for civil servants in Hong Kong; an agreement that Hong Kong should continue its 
present participation in the Universal Postal Union, the World Meteorological Organization, 
the International Maritime Organization and the International Telecommunication Union af-
ter 1997, see W H I T E PAPER II, supra note 64, at 3. 
66. See W H I T E PAPER I, supra note 64, at 2. 
67. Id. at 4. 
68. See Draft Agreement supra note 27; W H I T E PAPER II, supra note 64, at 5-6. 
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government to reflect the views of the people of Hong Kong to the Draft-
ing Committee has been reasonably active in pursuing its task.69 
(2) Interpretation 
The interpretation of the Joint Declaration appears to present more 
serious issues.70 These conflicts will be raised in summary form only by 
this author. Certain conflicts have already manifested themselves. Most 
notably is the vague stipulation of a high degree of autonomy for the 
territory.71 Vagueness may induce conflict because the parties involved 
(The PRC, Britain and Hong Kong) have different expectations with re-
spect to the meaning of autonomy. If autonomy were more strictly de-
fined, the scope for conflict would have been reduced. Critical terms 
such as "democratic consultation"72 in the constitution of the Basic Law 
Consultative Committee or "accountability"73 (which describes the rela-
tionship between the executive and legislative branches in art. I, annex I 
of the Joint Declaration) are subject to different interpretations.74 An-
other issue has arisen concerning the compatibility of political reforms in 
the pre-1997 period with the Joint Declaration. The Chinese argument is 
that pre-1997 political reforms should not deviate from the post-1997 
model of government that the PRC is presently designing, and more spe-
cifically, that direct elections to the Legislative Council are contrary to 
the spirit and principles of the Joint Declaration.75 The British Govern-
ment, on the other hand, could resort to a clause in the Joint Declaration 
which stipulates that "[t]he legislature of Hong Kong Special Adminis-
trative Region shall be constituted by election."76 And while no further 
69. WHITE PAPER II supra note 64, at 5-6. 
70. It has been noted that most of the difficulties arising from concluding treaties with the 
PRC involve disputes regarding interpretation. See Chiu, supra note 8, at 72, in which Chinese 
writer Lin Hsin described this problem as "sleeping in the same bed but dreaming different 
dreams." 
71. See Fong, HK Autonomy Won't Mean Independence, South China Morning Post, May 
5, 1987, at 1 (report on meeting with Lu Ping, General Secretary, Basic Law Drafting 
Committee). 
72. See Foreign Broadcast Information Service (China), September 16, 1985, at 105 (Ac-
cording to Xu Jiatun, Director of the New China News Agency in Hong Kong [Beijing's top 
official in Hong Kong], consultation is a form of democracy). 
73. See Foreign Broadcast Information Service (China), January 20, 1986, at 128 (In Xu 
Jiatun's words, "accountable" as used in the Joint Declaration means merely "the duty to give 
explanation and to seek advice"); See also commentary Drafters Find Consensus Elusive, South 
China Morning Post, October 27, 1986, at 15. 
74. See supra notes 72-73. 
75. See Yeung, Reforms May Mean Trouble, Warns Xu, South China Morning Post, No-
vember 22, 1983, at 11 (statement of Xu Jiatun that current moves towards political reforms 
constitute "a deviation from the spirit and principles of the Joint Declaration."). 
76. Draft Agreement, supra note 27, at 1373 annex I, art. 1. 
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details are provided as to the manner in which elections are to be con-
ducted, the text does not exclude the possibility of direct elections. In-
deed, given the object and purpose of establishing an autonomous SAR, 
and bearing in mind that one of the main attributes of autonomy in inter-
national law is a locally elected legislative body capable of independent 
decision making in local matters,77 an interpretation which embraces di-
rect election would not be inconsistent with the Joint Declaration. 
The "compatibility" issue is further complicated by China's percep-
tion of the Hong Kong Government as one performing a caretaker role 
prior to the transfer of sovereignty in 1997 and, therefore, inherently in-
capable of initiating significant structural changes. In support of this po-
sition, Chinese authorities cite the assumption of responsibility by Britain 
under article IV of the Joint Declaration "for the administration of Hong 
Kong with the object of maintaining and perserving its economic prosper-
ity and social stability" (emphasis added).78 Counterclaims are nonethe-
less available to the British Government, including the point that while 
the Sino-British agreement envisages continuation of legal, judicial, so-
cial and economic systems, no indication is given that the political struc-
ture would remain unchanged. In fact, China may be estopped from 
disputing political reforms having raised no objections to the fairly radi-
cal changes of the 1984 White Paper on Representative Government. 
China may also be estopped having not expressed any reservations in 
September 1985 when indirect elections were implemented.79 
Interpretation issues arising out of the Sino-British Joint Declara-
tion should also be viewed against the omission of a specific provision in 
the Joint Declaration for the settlement of disputes. Admittedly, the 
Joint Liaison Group is charged with the smooth transfer of government 
and the effective implementation of the Joint Declaration, but it is in-
tended to be an organ for liaison, consultation, exchange of information 
and is not equipped with supervisory or enforcement powers. Further-
more, the Group's mandate expires on January 1, 2000.80 The subtlety 
of some of the grey areas in the Declaration may allow the Chinese mem-
bers of the Liaison Group to claim literal application by reliance on the 
obscure intentions of the drafters.81 
77. See Hannum and Lillich, supra note 48, at 250. 
78. See Yeung, China Warns Hong Kong Not to Change Status Quo, South China Morn-
ing Post, May 25, 1987, at 1, col. 1 (interview with Fang Jun, Head of Kowloon Office of 
NCNA who said that any moves to change the powers of the Legislative Council and its 
composition were not within the jurisdiction of the Hong Kong government given the stipula-
tion in the Joint Declaration to the effect that the government is responsible for the mainte-
nance of the present systems, while the Basic Law will decree future systems). 
79. For an account of the reforms see WHITE PAPER I,, supra note 64, at 6-8. 
80. See Draft Agreement, supra note 27, annex II, § 6, at 1379. 
81. See Chiu, The 1984 Sino-British Agreement on Hong Kong and Its Implications on 
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Given the nature of the interpretation conflicts noted above, the lack 
of procedure for solving disputes may prove problematic.82 This is par-
ticularly true in the light of the PRC's reluctance to submit to third party 
adjudication for the settlement of international disputes and its nonac-
ceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of 
Justice.83 
(3) Succession of Treaties 
It is generally accepted that a territory which undergoes a change of 
sovereignty passes from the treaty regime of the preceding state directly 
to that of the acquiring one.84 Treaties of the successor state begin auto-
matically to apply from the date of succession.85 The treaties of the pred-
ecessor state cease automatically to apply from that date.86 State 
practice suggests, however, that this "moving treaty frontier rule" is not 
commonly adhered to in the context of acquisitions of territorial sover-
eignty over dependent territories. Rather, specific arrangements would 
be made in the treaty pertaining to the transfer of sovereignty. This was 
the position taken by the PRC and UK in the Sino-British Joint 
Declaration.87 
The problem faced by the drafters of the Joint Declaration was to 
ensure the continued prosperity of the territory and the maintenance of 
its status as the third most important financial center in the world.88 All 
China's Unification, 21 ISSUES AND STUDIES 13, 15 (1985) [hereinafter Chiu, The 1984 Sino-
British Agreement]. 
82. It has nonetheless been noted that the UK may force, by means of bargaining tech-
niques, the expansion of the Joint Liaison Group's authority in accordance with annex II, art. 
11 (which empowers the JLG to establish subgroups to deal with particular subjects requiring 
expert assistance) with a view to forming an arbitration panel similar to the Korean Armistice 
Commission to which the PRC uncharacteristically had given its consent. See Chinese and 
Western Treaty Practice; An Application to the Joint Declaration Between the People's Republic 
of China and Great Britain Concerning the Question of Hong Kong, 1 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & 
POL'Y 167, 191-92, 194 (1986). 
83. See Chiu, The 1984 Sino-British Agreement, supra note 81, at 15. 
84. See Klein, Treaties, Effects of Territorial Change, reprinted in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 473-75 (R. Bernhardt ed. 1984). See art. 15 of the 1978 Vi-
enna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties [hereinafter 1978 Succession 
Convention] 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 971, 975 (1978). 
85. Vienna Convention, supra note 84, art. 15: "When part of the territory of a State or 
when any territory for the international relations of which a State is responsible, not being part 
of the territory of that State, becomes part of the territory of another State: (a) treaties of the 
predecessor State cease to be in force in respect of the territory to which the succession of 
States relates from the date of the succession of State." 
86. Id. Under art. 15(b) "treaties of the successor State are in force in respect of the 
territory to which the succession of States relates from the date of the succession of States, 
unless it appears from the treaty or is otherwise established that the application of the treaty to 
that territory would be incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty or would radi-
cally change the conditions for its operation." 
87. See Draft Agreement, supra note 27, annex I, art. XIV, at 1377-78. 
88. See Jao, Hong Kong's Puture as a Financial Centre, THE THREE BANKS REV., March 
1985, at 35. 
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external links and international treaties had to continue. At the same 
time, the PRC, which is not a party to many of the international treaties 
applicable to the territory, could not accord to Hong Kong the independ-
ent power of concluding international agreements. The formula reached, 
therefore, provided that the international agreements implemented in 
Hong Kong remain in force even if the PRC is not a party to the agree-
ment. The application to the territory of international agreements to 
which the PRC is a party, if so decided by the Central People's Govern-
ment, would be considered in accordance with circumstances and needs 
of the SAR government after seeking the latter's view.89 
However, since third-party states to the treaties are not obliged to 
accept new parties within their treaty relations, their consent must be 
secured.90 This mammoth task has been undertaken by the Joint Liaison 
Group which appears to have adopted the strategy of ensuring the auton-
omous participation of the SAR in major international agreements such 
as GATT and MFA. This arrangement is used as a model precedent for 
solving similar issues. It is inevitable, nonetheless, that individual trea-
ties will need to be sustained and ad hoc solutions formulated. The 
smooth succession of treaties will depend on the willingness of the PRC 
to reconcile conflicting domestic pressures and exert influence on behalf 
of an autonomous Hong Kong. 
The applicability of two international treaties, however, has been as-
sured expressly in the Joint Declaration itself. Article XIII of annex I of 
the Joint Declaration stipulates that "[t]he Provisions of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Cov-
enant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as applied to Hong Kong 
shall remain in force" (notwithstanding that the PRC is a signatory to 
neither).91 It should be noted, however, that in Hong Kong, because 
89. See Draft Agreement, supra note 27, annex I, art. XI, at 1376. 
90. Although devolution (or "inheritance") agreements feature in State practice, doubts 
as to their legal validity vis-a-vis third parties have been expressed. See Lauterpacht, The 
Contemporary Practice of the United Kingdom in the Field of International Law—Survey and 
Comment, VI, January I—June 30, 1958, 7 I N T ' L & COMP. L.Q., 514, 525-26 (1958) (Lauter-
pacht maintains that "[t]he absence of any clear rule of international law relating to the assign-
ment of treaty rights and duties, coupled with the generally accepted principle pacta tertiis nee 
nocent nee prosunt, suggests that these agreements may be of no real legal force.'" Citing 
O'Connell, who considers that in strict law, the consent of other signatories to this novation of 
the contractual relationship would be essential.) See also Convention on Succession, supra 
note 84, art. 8: " 1 . The obligations or rights of the successor States towards other States 
parties to those treaties by reason only of the fact that the predecessor State and the successor 
State have concluded an agreement providing that such obligations or rights shall devolve 
upon the successor State." 
91. See Draft Agreement, supra note 27, annex I, art. XIII, at 1377. The PRC is under-
stood to have indicated during the Sino-British negotiations its intention to sign these two 
Covenants in the near future. See Lescot, Beijing Ready to Sign UN Human Rights Conven-
tions, South China Morning Post, November 25, 1986, at 1; Wong, China 'to Uphold Interna-
tional Rights Agreement', HK STANDARD, December 29, 1986, at 8; Chinese participation in a 
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treaties do not automatically form part of the local law,92 the rights and 
duties stemming from the covenants will not be enforceable locally unless 
incorporated by legislation into the domestic law. An implied commit-
ment to take such an action is contained in rights and freedoms enumer-
ated in article XIII of annex I of the Joint Declaration which envisages 
the inclusion in the Basic Law of the HK SAR.93 
(4) Nationality 
One of the most crucial issues arising from the transfer of sover-
eignty over Hong Kong is the nationality of its inhabitants. Little gui-
dance is provided, however, by international law. Generally, subject to 
the proscription of rendering people stateless,94 no express obligation is 
imposed under international law on the successor state to grant any right 
of option as to nationality. For that matter there is no corresponding 
obligation on the predecessor state to withdraw its nationality from per-
sons normally living or domiciled in the transferred territory.95 At the 
same time, a right to the option of nationality in such circumstances may 
be said to be derived from general notions underpinning human rights 
law96 or more specifically as a possible expression of the right to self-
UN sponsored workshop on human rights in Manila, December 1986, was also interpreted to 
mean that China is "on the verge of signing" the Covenants. See Beijing Close to Signing Two 
UN Conventions, South China Morning Post, January 19, 1987, at 9. 
92. Hong Kong follows British practice founded on the constitutional principle of separa-
tion of powers, whereby Parliament' s approval (in the form of legislation) must be granted for 
treaties (which are within the prerogative powers of the Crown-Executive) to have legal effect 
under municipal law. Such a practice is acknowledged in a number of judicial authorities (e.g., 
A-Gfor Canada v. A-G for Ontario [1937] A.C. 326, 347; Blackburn v. A-G [1971] 2 All E.R. 
1380; Laker Airways v. Department of Trade [1977] 1 Q.B. 643) which are binding on Hong 
Kong courts. Note, however, Mann's conclusion that "English courts, when the occasion or 
necessity arises, are in principle neither unable nor unwilling to look at, construe, and give 
effect to treaties which have not been adopted by Parliament." M A N N , FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN 
ENGLISH COURTS 87 (1986). 
93. See Draft Agreement, supra note 27, annex I, art. XIII, at 1377. See also PROGRESS 
R E P O R T OF THE [BLDC] SUBGROUP ON FUNDAMENTAL R I G H T S AND D U T I E S OF H O N G 
K O N G INHABITANTS, April 13, 1987. 
94. See 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.9/14, 
reprinted in 8 D I G . OF INT'L L. 91 (M. Whiteman ed. 1967), art. 10: " 1 . Every treaty between 
Contracting States providing for the transfer of territory shall include provisions designed to 
secure that no person shall become stateless as a result of the transfer. A Contracting State 
shall use its best endeavours to secure that any such treaty made by it with a State which is not 
a party to this Convention includes such provisions. 2. In the absence of such provisions a 
Contracting State to which a territory is transferred or which otherwise acquires territory shall 
confer its nationality on such persons as would otherwise become stateless as a result of the 
transfer or acquisition." 
95. State practice in respect of succession and nationality is sparse and varied, although a 
right of option of the inhabitants transferred was incorporated in peace treaties following the 
First and Second World Wars. See Oda, The Individual in International Law, in M A N U A L OF 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL L A W , 469, 479-80 (M. Sorensen ed. 1968). See also Gettys. The 
Effect of Changes of Sovereignty on Nationality, 21 A M . J. INT 'L L. 268, 271 (1927); Kunz, 
Nationality and Option Clauses in the Italian Peace Treaty, 41 A M . J. INT 'L L. 622 (1947). 
96. Included is human dignity (the idea of freedom to shape one's own fate being an 
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determination where sovereignty over a population is transferred with 
the territory without the population's consent.97 
The memoranda exchanged between the British and Chinese gov-
ernments as part of the Joint Declaration set out their respective posi-
tions of the status of British Dependent Territories Citizens (BDTC's) in 
Hong Kong and related issues. The UK position, as stated in its memo-
randum, is that since Hong Kong will no longer be a British dependent 
territory after 1997,98 BDTC's by virtue of some connection with Hong 
Kong would cease to have that status effective from July 1, 1997. It will 
not be possible to acquire BDTC citizenship by virtue of a connection 
with Hong Kong on or after July 1, 1997. The people excluded by this 
position will, however, be eligible to retain an appropriate status (not to 
be acquired by anyone born on or after July 1, 1997) which will enable 
them to continue to use British passports and receive consular protection 
when in third countries, provided they hold or are included in such a 
passport before July 1, 1997 (or up to December 1997 if born in the first 
six months of that year). Arrangements will be made for the renewal and 
replacement of those passports by UK consular officers.99 
The PRC's position in its memorandum as stated is that all Hong 
Kong compatriots, whether they are holders of the BDTC passport or 
not, are Chinese nationals.100 But, "taking account of the historical 
essential element of it). See P. W E I S , NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS 160 (1979) [herein-
after P. W E I S ] . In fact, the right of "voluntary expatriation" (or to change one's nationality) 
has increasingly been recognized in general community expectations as a fundamental human 
right. See McDougal, Laswell and Chen, Nataionality and Human Rights: The Protection of 
the Individual in External Arenas in INTERNATIONAL L A W ESSAYS: A SUPPLEMENT TO IN-
TERNATIONAL L A W IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 555, 583 (M. McDougal & W. Reis-
man eds. 1981). Such expectations are reflected in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, reprinted in J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER, N. LEECH, T H E INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYS-
TEM, Doc. Supp. 60 (1981), art. 15(2): "No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality 
nor denied the right to change his nationality"; See also the 1969 American Convention on 
Human Rights, reprinted in id., at 399. Note in particular the 1933 Inter-American Conven-
tion on Nationality concluded at Montevideo, December 26, 1933, 6 HUDSON, INTERNA-
TIONAL LEGISLATION 593 (1937), art. 4: "In case of the transfer of a portion of territory on 
the part of one of the States signatory hereof to another of such States, the inhabitants of such 
transferred territory must not consider themselves as nationals of State to which they are 
transferred, unless they expressly opt to change their original nationality." 
97. See Ress, supra note 54, at 21. See also Kiss, The People's Right to Self Determination 
7 H U M A N RIGHTS 165, 174 (1986). 
98. The practice of the UK has been largely influenced by the territorial nature of the 
common law; nationality is affected by the link or otherwise of the people with British terri-
tory. See Weis, supra note 96, at 139-40, 146, 148. 153-54, 158. 
99. A N ORDER IN COUNCIL HONG K O N G (BRITISH NATIONALITY) ORDER 1986 issued, 
further to the HONG K O N G A C T 1985, on June 5, 1986 giving effect to the British position. It 
accordingly provides that BDT citizenship cannot be retained or acquired by virtue of a con-
nection with Hong Kong after July 1, 1997 and that BDTC*s by virtue of such connection 
may. before that date, acquire the new form of British nationality known as British Nationals 
(Overseas) [BN(O)]. 
100. See Draft Agreement, supra note 27, at 1381. 
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background of Hong Kong and its realities,"101 the authorities of the 
PRC will, from July 1, 1997 permit Chinese nationals in Hong Kong to 
use travel documents issued by the UK government for the purpose of 
traveling to other states and regions. These persons will not be entitled, 
however, to British consular protection in the HK SAR and other parts 
of China.102 
Does this mean the people of Hong Kong have been accorded the 
right to the option of nationality? The answer to this question is contin-
gent on whether the British Nationality Order (BNO) provides a "na-
tionality" at all. The BNO provides a nationality without continued 
connection to Hong Kong,103 without the right to reside and live in the 
UK,104 and without the right to transmit it to one's offspring born after 
1997. Evidently, the PRC does not consider it a nationality or else it 
would not have agreed to what manifestly transgresses the PRC's funda-
mental prohibition of dual nationality.105 A statement by an official of 
the Hong Kong government suggests that the Hong Kong government 
also regards the BNO passport as a travel document that attests to the 
bearer's residential status, not his nationality.106 Furthermore, it is possi-
ble that other states would not recognize the UK's undertaking of diplo-
matic (or consular) protection and refuse permission to British 
diplomatic missions to intervene on behalf of BNO since the "genuine 
link" in the sense of the Nottebohm Case107 is lacking. Such countries 
may entertain doubts, for instance, as to whether the UK would accept 
101. Id. The "realities" are the fact that Hong Kong functioned independently from the 
PRC for a long time and is perceived as a semi-autonomous entity. 
102. Id. 
103. In fact, a BNO passport does not give its holder a right of abode anywhere. Instead 
the passport will state that the holder has a HK identity card which grants the holder the right 
of abode in Hong Kong. Britain had to obtain from the PRC permission, to insert this state-
ment on the BNO passport (Memoranda were exchanged on April 11, 1986 between the Brit-
ish Embassy in Beijing and the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs). See W H I T E PAPER II, 
supra note 64, at 4-5. 
104. It should be noted, however, that the British government, in response to a request 
from the Legislative Council has agreed to introduce an endorsement into the BNO passport 
exempting the holder from the requirement of entry certificate or visa to visit the UK. See 
London Endorses BN(O) Visa-free Entry, HK Standard, April 24, 1986, at 2 [hereinafter 
London Endorses] (texts of a parliamentary question asked by MP Colin Moynihan and the 
written reply given by the Home Secretary Sir Douglas Hurd). 
105. See The 1980 Nationality Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 3. which states 
that "the People's Republic of China does not recognise dual nationality for any Chinese na-
tional," reprinted in 40 BEIJING R E V . 17, 18 (1980). For a discussion of the importance at-
tached by the PRC to this question see Ginsburgs, The 1980 Nationality Law of the People's 
Republic of China, 30 A M . J. COMP. L. 459 (1982). 
106. See Henricus, Groups Worry About Future Rights of Abode, HK Standard, April 4. 
1987, at 1. 
107. In this case the ICJ held that Guatemala was entitled to treat a naturalized Liechten-
stein citizen as a German, even though he had forfeited German citizenship on naturalization, 
because he had no genuine link with Liechtenstein. In the words of the Court, "[nationality is 
a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, 
interests and sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duites. It may be 
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responsibility for, and meet temporary financial demands on behalf of, or 
arrange the repatriation of a BNO passport holder who encounters diffi-
culties while visiting a foreign country. It seems, in the final analysis, 
that the BNO passport is no more than a travel document whose value 
hinges on the number of countries that are prepared to formally recog-
nize it.108 
Particularly problematic is the post-1997 status of the territory's res-
idents who are neither Chinese nor expatriates holding foreign passports. 
While their Chinese BDTC brethren will be given Chinese nationality 
and granted a BNO passport which may offer them some "extra travel 
privileges," non-Chinese BDTCs, although entitled to the new BNO 
passport, may in effect be deprived of a nationality, thereby becoming 
stateless. Admittedly, according to the Joint Declaration such persons 
may have the right of abode (e.g. to enter, live and work) in Hong Kong 
by virtue of their continuous residence of at least seven years and the fact 
that they have taken the territory to be their place of permanent resi-
dence.109 A right of abode, however, is quite distinct from the conception 
of nationality. 
To prevent non-Chinese BDTCs, their children and grandchildren 
from becoming stateless, the Hong Kong BNO of 1986 entitles them to 
yet another status, namely that of British Overseas Citizens (BOC).110 
This new status, however, gives them no right of abode in Britain or 
anywhere else; their right of abode in Hong Kong must derive instead 
from the laws of a region which will be part of a country whose national-
ity law is drawn up along racial lines. And while the British Home Sec-
retary believes that the government of the day would "consider" 
sympathetically the case for admission to the UK, if any British national 
were in the future to come under pressure to leave Hong Kong,' ' ' other 
said to constitute the judicial expression of the fact that the individual upon whom it is con-
ferred, either directly by the law or as the result of an act of the authorities, is in fact more 
closely connected with the population of the State conferring nationality than with that of any 
other State." [emphasis added] Note also the introduction into the British Nationality Act of 
1981 the requirement of "a real and close personal connection with the United Kingdom" for 
the acquisition of British citizenship. See Home Office, British Nationality Law Outline of 
Proposed Legislation (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1981), at 2. 
108. So far only 24 countries have done so, following the extensive diplomatic exercise 
embarked upon by the UK in September 1986 to explain to other countries the new status and 
the corresponding passport. See Robinson, New Passports Issued, But Only 24 Nations Say 
Yes, South China Morning Post, July 1, 1987, at 2. 
109. See Draft Agreement, supra note 27, annex I, art. XIV, at 1377-78. 
110. Article 6(2) confers BOC citizenship to former HK BDTCs automatically at birth on 
children born on or after July 1, 1997 if these children would be otherwise stateless. The 
automatic provisions that apply to the first generation do not apply to the second generation, 
but the latter have an entitlement to registration as BOC's; Articles 6(3) & 6(4). 
111. See London Endorses, supra note 104. 
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states may not necessarily be impressed with the nationality claims of 
such a person. 
V. HONG KONG'S "INTERNATIONAL" STATUS AFTER THE 
TRANSITION TO CHINESE RULE IN 1997 
As indicated earlier, the Joint Declaration pronounced that the HK 
SAR "shall enjoy a high degree of autonomy."112 No definition of auton-
omy is provided in the treaty, nor is one in fact available in any other 
international document. Hannum and Lillich acknowledge, in the sur-
vey referred to previously, the inherent elasticity of the term and admit 
that a "firm definition that is appropriate in all cases is impossible."113 
Yet they make a genuine effort to identify the "minimum governmental 
powers that a territory would need to possess if it were to be considered 
fully autonomous and self-governing."114 These governmental powers 
comprise of a locally elected legislative body capable of independent deci-
sion making in local matters (e.g. health, education, social services, local 
taxation, internal trade and commerce, environmental protection, zoning 
and local government structure and organization); a locally chosen Chief 
Executive with general responsibility for administration and execution of 
local laws or decrees, and an independent local judiciary.115 
To what extent will the HK SAR correspond with such a model of 
autonomy? Under the Joint Declaration it will be vested with "execu-
tive, legislative and independent judicial power, including that of final 
adjudication."116 More specifically, its legislative capacity is set out in 
art. II of annex I, which stipulates that the legislature "may on its own 
authority enact laws in accordance with the provisions of the Basic Law 
and legal procedures."117 The Joint Declaration also provides that the 
legislature will be established by election.118 At the same time, no fur-
ther details are given as to the manner in which election is to be con-
ducted. Thus, since the Joint Declaration envisages a continuation after 
1997 of the system of government which exists prior to that date, 
whether the SAR's legislature will be "locally elected" would depend 
largely on the progress made in the current development of the represen-
tative government in Hong Kong. At present only twenty-four of the 
Legislative Council's fifty-six members are elected.114 It is probable, 
112. See supra note 76. 
113. See Hannum and Lillich, supra note 48, at 250. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. at 250-51. 
116. See Draft Agreement, supra note 27, art. 3(3), at 1371. 
117. See supra note 27, at 1373. 
118. See Draft Agreement, supra note 76, annex I, art. I and accompanying text. 
119. Until 1985, the Legislative Council consisted of appointed members only. Following 
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therefore, that if Hong Kong does not have a strong and soundly based 
government with some claim to a popular mandate, it will be incapable 
of resisting the inevitable erosion of the system. 
Yet, doubts as to the capability of independent lawmaking of even a 
"locally elected" body in the SAR government have been raised.120 On 
the face of it, the National People's Congress (NPC) of the PRC, which 
is charged with the enactment and promulgation of a Basic Law for 
Hong Kong, is also authorized (through its Standing Committee) to in-
terpret it and consider the annulment of laws of the HK SAR if such 
laws contravene the Basic Law. The Standing Committee of the NPC is 
additionally empowered under the Chinese Constitution "to annul those 
regulations or decisions of the organs of state power of. . . autonomous 
regions . . . that contravene the Constitution, the Statutes or the admin-
istrative rules and regulations," thus imposing further potential con-
straints on the legislative power of the HK SAR legislature. 
As argued elsewhere,121 however, doubts concerning the powers of 
the NPC in relation to the Basic Law may be unwarranted. In particu-
lar, attention should be drawn to the fact that the interpretive authority 
of the NPC Standing Committee is rarely employed.122 Moreover, its 
interpretive authority is not concentrated at one institutional level and 
may be shared with local courts in the same manner as the NPC Stand-
ing Committee shares with parallel bodies such as the Supreme People's 
Court, Supreme People's Protectorate, State Council, Provincial People's 
Congresses and Government.123 Finally, it should be noted that the 
Standing Committee's power to annul local legislation that contravenes 
Chinese laws may be inapplicable in special administrative zones such as 
Hong Kong.124 
It is nonetheless unclear to what extent the SAR legislature will be 
the only law making body for the territory on matters within its jurisdic-
tion or, in other words, whether legislation (other than the Basic Law 
the principles formulated in the 1984 Hong Kong Government Paper on the Further Develop-
ment of Representative Government in Hong Kong, twenty-four members of the Council 
have, since 1985, been chosen by a system of indirect election. Twelve are elected by electoral 
college, comprising all members of the District Boards and the Urban Regional Councils 
(themselves consisting of both elected and appointed members), and twelve by functional con-
stituencies representing significant sectors of the community. A green paper has now been 
published exploring further developments in representative government. T H E 1987 R E V I E W 
OF DEVELOPMENTS IN REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT, Hong Kong Government, May 
1987. 
120. See Chiu, supra note 81, at 17-19. 
121. See Mushkat, supra note 15, at 180-83. 
122. Id. at 182. 
123. Id. at 181-82. 
124. Id. at 182. 
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and matters concerning foreign affairs and defense) enacted by the Chi-
nese authorities shall apply domestically after sovereignty reverts to the 
mainland.125 
The second requirement identified by Hannum and Lillich,126 
namely to have a locally chosen Chief Executive, poses perhaps a greater 
challenge to the autonomy of the HK SAR since under the Joint Decla-
ration the final decision with respect to the appointment lies with the 
Central People's Government.127 It is arguable, however, that the mech-
anism envisioned under the Joint Declaration to have selection of a Chief 
Executive through consultation or by election held locally is unworkable. 
An appointment by the Central People's Government provides the HK 
SAR with only a "veto power" rather than a direct positive power of 
appointment.128 By the same token, the autonomous status of the Chief 
Executive lies in the answer to questions such as "will [he] have the sole 
right of introducing bills into the legislative chamber or possess the 
power of veto? Will he be expected to carry out policies formulated by 
the Central People's Government or the Communist Party in 
Beijing?"129 
Finally, the importance of an independent local judiciary to the ter-
ritory's autonomy cannot be overemphasized. The Joint Declaration ap-
pears to safeguard the independence of the judiciary. It provides that 
judges will be appointed by the Chief Executive who will act in accord-
ance with the recommendation of an independent commission comprised 
of local judges, persons from the legal profession and "other eminent 
persons."130 Removal of judges, on the other hand, is only exercised for 
inability to discharge the functions of their office or for misbehavior. Re-
moval is initiated by the Chief Executive acting in accordance with the 
recommendation of a tribunal appointed by the chief judge of the court 
125. The issue was recently debated by the Basic Law Drafting Committee and a "compro-
mise" proposal emerged to the effect that China's State Council will only be allowed to issue an 
order to the future Chief Executive of the SAR enabling him to enact laws corresponding to 
the national laws if they are in accordance with the Basic Law and article 31 of the Chinese 
Constitution (which provides for the setting up of the SAR). See Yeung, Compromise Over 
Laws, South China Morning Post, April 15, 1987, at 7. Note, however, Basic Law drafter 
Martin Lee's objection to the application in the HK SAR of any Chinese laws, besides those on 
defense and foreign affairs, as a breach of the Sino-British Declaration. See, Yeung, Sub-group 
View 'Violates Joint Declaration', South China Morning Post, June 9, 1987, at 2. 
126. See Hannum and Lillich, supra note 48. 
127. See Draft Agreement, supra note 27, annex I. art. I. 1| 3, at 1373. 
128. A local commentator speculated that the appointment will be a "mere formality" to 
demonstrate China's sovereignty over Hong Kong. He suggests that if the Central Govern-
ment refused to appoint the Chief Executive elected by the local legislature, a constitutional 
crisis will follow with a serious adverse impact on the stability and prosperity of the territory. 
See Cheng, Looking at the Other Options, South China Morning Post, March 2, 1986, at 11. 
129. Wesley-Smith, China and Hong Kong, in N E W ZEALAND AND CHINA PAPERS OF 
THE T W E N T Y - F I R S T FOREIGN POLICY SCHOOL 1986, at 87, 92 (Trotter ed. 1986). 
130. See Draft Agreement, supra note 27, annex I, art. Ill, at 1373-74. 
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of final appeal and consisting of no fewer than three local judges.131 It 
may be argued, however, that unless the pre- and post-1997 judiciary is 
made truly independent, it may not be able to prevent executive action 
contrary to the spirit of the Joint Declaration. At present, Hong Kong 
judges are employed by the Hong Kong government and their salaries 
are determined in accordance with the Civil Service pay scale. A Magis-
trate's appointment is subject to contracts which are renewable at the 
discretion of the Judicial Services Commission. Worries over conditions 
of pay and security of tenure may thus cast a shadow over the indepen-
dence of judges.132 
Of equal importance for an autonomous HK SAR is the scope of 
judicial power, especially the power to interpret the Basic Law and re-
view legislation that conflicts with it. The Joint Declaration states that 
the power of final adjudication "shall vest in the courts of the HK 
SAR."133 While this certainly means that after 1997 appeals from these 
courts will no longer go to the Privy Council in London,134 it is not clear 
whether it covers interpretation of the Basic Law. The issue has not yet 
been resolved authoritatively, although it is conceivable that the Hong 
Kong courts will be granted the judicial power of interpreting the Basic 
Law in deciding cases after 1997, whereas the NPC will retain a legisla-
tive power of interpretation, namely the power to amplify laws by legisla-
tive edict. 
As observed by Hannum and Lillich,135 autonomy is not inconsis-
tent with the retention by the central or sovereign government of author-
ity over foreign relations and national defense. Thus, the stipulation in 
the Joint Declaration that "foreign and defense affairs are the responsibil-
ities of the Central People's Government"136 should not detract from the 
SAR autonomy especially given the considerable formal power to be re-
tained by the latter under the accord. The formal power includes the 
authority, under the name of "Hong Kong, China," to enter into agree-
ments with states, regions and international organizations in appropriate 
131. Id. 
132. Note that a Judiciary Bill designed to officially separate the judiciary from govern-
ment has been proposed. See Course, Bill Will Ensure 1997 Independence. Plan to "Free" 
Hong Kong Judiciary, South China Morning Post, June 3, 1985, at 1. See also Course, Judici-
ary Split From the Government Expected Soon, South China Morning Post, December 10, 
1987, at 1. 
133. See Draft Agreement, supra note 27, annex I, art. Ill, H 1, at 1373. 
134. See id. "Explanatory Notes" n.12, at 1383. 
135. See Hannum and Lillich, supra note 48. 
136. See Draft Agreement, supra note 27, art. 111(2), at 1371. Note that article XII of 
annex I provides that military forces sent by the PRC to be stationed in the HK SAR for the 
purpose of defense shall not interfere in the internal affairs of the HK SAR. Commentators, 
like Chiu question, however, whether in the light of historical events, particularly Tibet be-
tween 1950 and 1959, PRC forces will really abstain from interfering in the internal affairs of 
the HK SAR. See Chiu, supra note 81, at 20. 
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fields (e.g. economic, trade, financial and monetary)137 and the freedom 
to formulate the territory's own internal economic policies.138 Whether 
other states will recognize these special powers of "Hong Kong, China", 
remains open to dispute. It is clear in any event, that without the express 
consent of third parties, such third parties will incur no obligations or 
liabilities under the Joint Declaration.139 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Indeed, in the final analysis, the viability of autonomy for the SAR 
will be determined largely by third parties' responses as well as Chinese 
attitudes, policies and developments within Hong Kong.140 These fac-
tors are open to conflicting interpretations and can thus lead to the con-
struction of a number of scenarios ranging from highly optimistic to 
highly pessimistic. Other countries, which are not parties to the Sino-
British Joint Declaration and are thus not bound by it, may opt to treat 
Hong Kong as an autonomous entity or instead may find it more expedi-
ent to regard it as an integral part of the PRC. Chinese attitudes and 
policies constitute an even more critical variable because of Hong Kong's 
dependence on Beijing and the fact that the PRC is likely to be con-
strained by the provisions of the Sino-British Joint Declaration only if 
they coincide with the broader national interests (as perceived by the 
country's power holders). Finally, Hong Kong may continue to function 
smoothly or it may show signs of disintegration (in the latter case, China 
may feel compelled to assume control whether or not it is favorably dis-
posed towards the notion of autonomy). It is realistic to suppose that 
these complex factors, rather than formal international legal agreements, 
will influence the evolution of Hong Kong from a British colony to a 
special administrative region of the PRC and determine its ability to re-
main stable and prosperous. 
137. See Draft Agreement, supra note 27, art. 111(10), at 1372, and annex I, art. XI, <1 1, at 
1376. 
138. See id., Annex I, art. VI, U 1, at 1375. 
139. See Vienna Convention, supra note 5, art. 34 dictates that "A treaty does not create 
either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent." Article 35 dictates that "An 
obligation arises for a third State from a provision of a treaty if the parties to the treaty intend 
the provision to be the means of establishing the obligation and the third State expressly ac-
cepts that obligation in writing." The general rule in art. 34, which is known as pacta tertiis 
nee nocent nee prosunt, or agreements shall neither burden nor benefit third parties, reflects 
customary international law. See generally HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 608 (1983). 
140. See Mushkat, supra note 15, at 183-89. 
